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Abstract
We study the effect of superstition and conspicuous spending motive on housing
demand and price in Singapore. We find that buyers pay less for homes with un-
lucky addresses and more for homes with lucky addresses. There were fewer housing
transactions on inauspicious days of the lunar calendar when people are advised to
avoid making major economic decisions. This suggests that superstitious belief still
affects economic activities. The demand for lucky addresses is also weaker on these
inauspicious days, suggesting that superstitious belief indeed affects the demand for
lucky addresses. Moreover, the price premium for lucky address is significantly higher
for apartments of larger size or on top floors. Since these two housing features can
signal wealth and are highly visible, the larger price premium suggests that conspicu-
ous spending motive also plays a significant role in the Singapore housing market. We
also find that informed buyers, even with less superstitious or conspicuous spending
motive, might still pay price premiums for lucky addresses. In contrast, uninformed
buyers are unlikely to pay a premium for these addresses.
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1 Introduction
For most people, buying a house is their single largest financial commitment. Like other
investments, housing investments present many uncertainties – notably, the quality of the
construction and maintenance, whether the home will fit the family’s future needs, the
development of the neighborhood, and the evolution of interest rates and housing prices.
Research in psychology suggests that individuals rely on superstition as a way to cope
with misfortune and uncertainty, and to rationalize a complex world (Vyse 1997; Ang et
al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2014). Given the large stakes and many uncertainties, people may
well rely on superstitious cues when buying a home.
Prior researches have shown that many Chinese have a strong preference for houses
numbered “8” and dislike houses numbered “4” (Shum et al. 2014; Fortin et al. 2014).
These authors generally attribute these preferences to superstitious belief. However, these
preferences could also be expressions of conspicuous spending to signal future wealth or
status, rather than or in addition to superstition. Where to live, how big a house is, and
expensive interior decorations are all visible and even conspicuous. House numbers are
visible as well. Although they have no intrinsic value, people might pay more for number
“8” to show that they can afford it. Just as they pay more to live in a more expensive
neighborhood or build a flashier mansion.
Existing literature has found evidence on individuals engaging in conspicuous spending
to signal their future wealth or status (Feltovich et al. 2002; Charles et al. 2009; Heffetz
2011). For instance, living in a big house or having a house on the top floor of a build-
ing could be possible ways to signal wealth or status to potential business partners and
spouses (Wei et al., 2012). Charles et al. (2009) and Heffetz (2011) emphasize the need to
understand conspicuous spending in housing, yet qualify that such research is challenging
due to confounding factors and measurement issues.
This paper investigates the effects of superstitious belief and conspicuous motive on
housing demand in Singapore. Our unique empirical setting offer three advantages in
studying the impact of superstition on asset prices and trading behavior. First, the Sin-
gapore’s government imposes strict regulations on the numbering of high-rise buildings,
1
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which requires the unit numbers to follow a fixed format; and prohibits the manipulations
by developers by skipping unlucky numbers in a building. The unique rules allow us to
eliminate possible endogeneity caused by the supply-side adjustments by developers, and
clearly identify the demand-side preferences of Chinese buyers. Second, by using only
data on brand-new apartments in high-rise buildings, where the floors are highly homo-
geneous, if not identical, we could analyze prices and buyer preferences by examining
variations across locations and unobserved quality of interior upgrades and maintenance
of the units. Third, Singapore is a multiracial country comprising Chinese majority and
other non-Chinese minority races. Using the non-Chinese group as a clean control group,
we identify the superstitious belief that is specific to only Chinese. The non-Chinese
buyers are unlikely to have consumption motives, but are likely to have only investment
motives when buying houses with lucky addresses.
Specifically, under the competing hypotheses of superstition and conspicuous spending,
we develop predictions for the effects of various factors on buyer preference for lucky
addresses. Next, we construct a novel dataset consisting of over 54,000 transactions of
new apartments in Singapore’s private housing market between 2000 and 2009, matched
to the data on ethnicity, nationality, age, and information of firm registration. Then,
we run empirical contests between alternative hypotheses of superstition and conspicuous
spending.
Following the existing literature, we first document a considerable price discount of
1.3 percent for very unlucky addresses, and a price premium of 1.9 percent for very lucky
addresses. The price differentials exist both across unit numbers and floors. Consistent
with Fortin et al. (2014), we also find that the observed price differentials depend on the
share of Chinese buyers in the locality. In particular, buyers can only enjoy price discounts
for unlucky addresses in buildings where the share of Chinese buyers of unlucky addresses
is at least 80 percent. The evidence suggests that buyers are sorted by their preferences
for unlucky and lucky addresses, and the observed price differentials are determined by
the preferences of the marginal buyers.
We then investigate the possible mechanisms: superstition and conspicuous spending.
2
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To test the role of superstition in lucky address premium, we use home buyers behavior
that is correlated with superstition but not correlated with conspicuous motives to mea-
sure whether individuals are superstitious. One indicator for buyers’ superstitious belief is
their economic activities during the “Ghost Month”. According to the Chinese Astrology,
the “Ghost Month” that falls on the seventh month of the lunar calendar is inauspicious.
Individuals should avoid making important decisions during the month. Consistent with
this belief, we indeed observe that there are fewer housing transactions and firm regis-
trations during the Ghost Month (Agarwal et al. (2018)). Moreover, individuals who
registered a firm in the Ghost Month are also more likely to buy an apartment in the
Ghost Month, which suggests that the decline in both activities in the Ghost Month is
likely to be driven by people’s superstitious belief rather than pure chances. Hence, it
is reasonable to assume individuals who bought an apartment or registered a firm in the
Ghost Month are less superstitious. If superstitious belief is indeed responsible for the ob-
served price differentials between apartments with lucky, unlucky, and neutral addresses,
these less superstitious buyers should have weaker demand for lucky addresses. Our esti-
mation results confirm this prediction, and support that superstition can help to explain
the observed price differentials.
To test the role of conspicuous motive in lucky address premium, we use home charac-
teristics that are correlated with conspicuous spending but uncorrelated with superstition.
Specifically, apartments of larger size or on top floors can signal their owner’s wealth.
Hence, these two housing features could have conspicuous values. Moreover, we show
that the demands for these two types of apartments are not correlated with the degree
of superstition, as measured by the propensity of property purchase or firm registration
during the Ghost Month. If the willingness to pay for lucky addresses and the dislike
for unlucky addresses are partially driven by conspicuous consumption, these buyers are
also willing to pay a premium for larger apartments or apartments on top floors. Our
results are consistent with this prediction, and support that conspicuous consumption is
also responsible for the observed price differentials.
Having documented the roles of superstition and conspicuous consumption, we further
3
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analyze the behavior and interaction between different type of buyers. Presumably, some
buyers are neither superstitious nor conspicuous. These buyers could be either informed
– buyers who know about other people’s preference for lucky addresses – or uninformed –
buyers who do not know about the preferences of others. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first to show how these buyers are affected by other buyers’ preferences
in the housing market. We show that informed buyers, even though they themselves are
neither superstition nor conspicuous, might still pay price premiums for lucky addresses.
This is most likely because they might sell their apartments to superstitious or conspicuous
buyers in the resale market. In contrast, uninformed buyers are unlikely to pay a premium.
These results suggest an interesting redistribution effect due to the preference for lucky
addresses: uninformed buyers might benefit more than informed buyers.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on the roles of superstition and conspicuous spending in the housing market.
Consistent with the results of Hirshleifer et al. (2012), Shum et al. (2014), and Fortin
et al. (2014), we show that the preference for lucky numbers affects both the demand
and the prices for housing unit with lucky addresses. Since the Singapore’s government
imposes strict regulations that disallow developers to manipulate the numbering of units,
we are able to disentangle the demand-side preferences from the supply-sides adjustments,
and thus eliminate possible endogeneity in the supply-side responses that could distort the
results. While the preference for lucky numbers could be caused either by superstition or
by conspicuous consumption; the existing literature invariably assumes that superstition
is the key factor driving the price differentials across different address types. Our paper
provides direct empirical evidence showing that both superstition and conspicuous spend-
ing matter in explaining buyers preference for lucky addresses. We further analyze how
the heterogeneity in buyers’ preferences affect the price differentials. Consistent with the
hypothesis that it is the preferences of the marginal buyers that determine the magnitudes
of the price differentials, we find that the shares of different types of buyers in the locality
affects the observed price differentials. Our thought experiment conducted using Singa-
pore’s housing market data could be naturally extended to explaining consumer behaviors
4
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in other markets.
Second, we contribute to board literature of behaviorial finance and show non-standard
preference affects important financial decisions (DellaVigna 2009). Existing literature have
studied the effect of non-standard preference in various markets, including weather effects
on personal mood and stock returns (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003), risk attitudes in
capital markets (Kliger and Levy 2003), and household spending (Agarwal et al. 2012).
Some researchers associate solar and lunar eclipses with lower trading volume and stock
returns in U.S. and Asian equity markets, and they find larger volatility in stock prices
during the eclipses (Lepori 2009). In China, newly listed firms with lucky listing codes
are also found to have traded at premiums, but the premiums dissipate over three years
(Hirshleifer et al. 2016). We study a particular preference: the preference for lucky number
due to superstition or conspicuous spending. We show that home purchase decisions could
be driven by superstitious belief or conspicuous motive of buyers, especially for Chinese
buyers.
Moreover, by analyzing the behavior and interaction between different type of buyers,
we show that while informed buyers pay price premiums regardless of whether they have
superstitious or conspicuous preferences, uninformed buyers are unlikely to pay a premium.
As a result, uninformed buyers could outperform informed buyers when they sell their
apartments. These findings are related to the literature on heterogeneous investors in
financial market (Delong et al. 1990; Hong and Stein 1999; Mendel and Shleifer 2012;
Barberis et al. 2015).
2 Institutional Backgrounds
2.1 Chinese Numerology and Astrology
Chinese is a language with a common written script, but spoken differently in different
regions. In some Chinese dialects, the number “8” is pronounced like the word “prosper-
ity”, while the number “4” is pronounced like the word “death”. Consequently, “8” is
considered to be lucky, and “4” to be unlucky. As Hirshleifer et al. (2016) observe, Chi-
5
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nese numerological symbolism, which derives from Confucian and Taoist beliefs, deviates
from the scientific notions of causality in two ways. The similarity in the pronunciation
of a number to another word is believed to have a causal impact. Further, association
with the number (and so, indirectly with the word) is believed to have an effect on the
likelihood of experiencing favorable or unfavorable outcomes.
The effect of Chinese numerological superstition has been extensively studied. The
government of Hong Kong sells new vehicle license numbers by public auction. In auctions
between 1997 and 2009, the prices of vehicle license numbers including the lucky “8” were
systematically higher, while prices of vehicle license numbers including the unlucky “4”
were lower (Ng et al. 2010).
However, the premium for “8” could also be interpreted as conspicuous spending to
signal wealth or status. The conspicuous spending interpretation is consistent with the
premium for “8” falling after 2006, when the government introduced vanity license num-
bers, thereby providing car owners more avenues to signal their wealth and status.
Most research into Chinese numerological superstition has focused on real estate.
Fortin et al. (2014) analyzed the sales of about 117,000 of single-family homes in the
Greater Vancouver area between 2000 and 2005. In neighborhoods with relatively more
Chinese residents and in repeated transactions, the transacted prices of houses with street
address numbers ending in “4” were 2.2 percent lower and those ending in “8” were 2.5
percent higher than houses with other addresses. However, these findings might be con-
founded by unobservable differences between houses, or explained by conspicuous spend-
ing.1
Shum et al. (2014) studied a random sample of high-rise residential sales in Chengdu,
a large city in the southwest of China, between 2004 and 2006. The prices of apartments
on floors ending with a number “8” were 8.7 percent higher when sold as second-hand
but not significantly higher when sold as new. Buyers who had more 8’s in their mobile
telephone numbers were more likely to buy apartments on the lucky 8th floor. However,
1Houses numbered “4” were older, while those numbered “8” were newer and had better features. The
difference in age might be related to people buying houses numbered “4”, rebuilding and then, petitioning
to renumber. In neighborhoods with more Chinese, house numbers ending in “0”, “5”, and “8” were more
frequent (Fortin et al. 2014: Figure 3).
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more educated people were not less likely, and older people were not more likely to buy 8th
floor homes. To the extent that age and education are correlated with superstition, these
results are not consistent with superstition as the explanation behind the premium paid
for number “8”. Indeed, the estimates seem more consistent with conspicuous spending.
A mobile number with more 8’s is very conspicuous.
Hirshleifer et al. (2016) investigated the effect of superstition on equity markets in
the context of initial public offerings in China between 1991 and 2005. On the Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock exchanges, listed companies are identified by a numerical code, which
is the equivalent of the U.S. ticker. For instance, the listing code of the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China is 601398.SS. Consistent with superstition, the proportion of
issuers with lucky listing codes (that included at least one lucky digit and no unlucky
digit) was abnormally high, and the proportion of issuers with unlucky listing codes was
abnormally low. Moreover, newly listed shares with lucky listing codes initially traded
at a premium relative to shares with unlucky listing codes, but the premium dissipated
within three years.2
Besides numerological superstition, astrology also plays a significant role in the daily
life of the Chinese. One well known example is that Chinese people attach real meaning
to the zodiac calendar, which comprises a 12-year cycle, each named after an animal. The
dragon year is considered to be particularly auspicious and is associated with surges of
new births among Chinese people. In a study of the U.S. population, Johnson and Nye
(2011) found that Asians born in dragon years are more educated than those born in
other years, which suggests that Asian parents invest more in the education of dragon
children. However, in a separate study using Singapore’s data, Agarwal (2017) found
the opposite results indicating that dragon babies face less favorable labor market and
economic outcomes in terms of salaries, university admissions, savings and consumption,
when they grow up.
In addition to the zodiac, another influential Chinese astrological belief is that people
2Different researchers defined the lucky numbers somewhat differently. Shum et al. (2014) defined both
“6” and “8” as lucky, while Hirshleifer et al. (2016) considered “6”, “8”, and “9” to be lucky. Nevertheless,
a common thread is that “8” is lucky and “4” is unlucky.
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should avoid making important decisions, such as opening a business, buying or renovating
a house, and having a wedding, during the Ghost Month, the seventh month of the lunar
calendar year. This is because according to Chinese folk culture, the gates separating the
hell realm and the living realm open on the fifteenth day of the seventh month. Ghosts
and spirits of deceased ancestors come out from the lower realm to visit the living families,
and in some cases, to seek revenge on those who have done wrongs against them in their
past life. To pacify spirits wandering on the earth, a considerable number of Chinese in
Singapore burn ritualistic offerings on road sides, such as food, joss sticks, candles, paper
money, paper houses and clothes in the Ghost Month. As a result, the belief is still very
salient in modern Singapore.
2.2 Singapore Housing Market
Singapore is an island nation with a total land area of about 716 square kilometers. As of
June 2012, the population of the country was estimated at 5.31 million, which include 3.29
million citizens and 533,000 permanent residents. The resident population is ethnically
diverse comprising 74 percent Chinese and 26 percent other races.3 Singapore’s ethnic
diversity provides a natural setting to investigate the effect of superstition and conspic-
uous consumption in the housing market. Non-Chinese and individuals who purchased
properties or registered firms during the Ghost Month provide a ready control group to
test whether the preference for lucky numbers and dislike for unlucky number are due to
superstition.
Singapore has among the world’s highest home ownership rate of over 90 percent. The
residential market comprises two segments. About 77 percent of the housing stocks are
apartments or flats built by a government housing agency, the Housing and Development
Board (HDB), mostly for direct sale to eligible citizens at subsidized prices. Public housing
is primarily owner-occupied, with a small proportion of the flats set aside for rental by low
income families. The government closely regulates the sale and resale of public housing.4
3These and the following statistics of Singapore’s population and housing market are drawn from the
Yearbook of Statistics 2013 and the Census of Population 2010, Department of Statistics, Singapore.
4A unique feature of Singapore’s public housing is an explicit policy to ensure ethnic diversity (Wong
2013). The Housing and Development Board regulates the resale of apartments by building and area to
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The remaining 23 percent of the housing stocks are in the private housing market. It
is laissez-faire, except that foreigners are not allowed to buy low-rise buildings such as
single-family homes. Thus, we focus on Singapore’s private housing, where preferences for
lucky and unlucky numbers are more likely to be fully revealed.
The Singapore government strictly regulates street addresses and the numbering of
apartments. The Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS), which is responsible for
collecting taxes on real estate and real estate transactions, has stipulated a specific format
for the numbering of all apartment buildings. The format comprises a block number and
then a unit number arranged in a sequence of two digits or characters designating the
floor, a hyphen, and two or three digits or characters designating the location on the floor.
For instance, apartment number 05-08 is the 8th unit on the 5th floor.
The IRAS enforces compliance with the numbering plan. With regard to the numbering
of floors, the IRAS states unequivocally, “‘01’ is normally assigned to the first level of a
building where the main entrance is located, followed by ‘02’ for the second level and so on.
Omission of any numbers is not allowed” (IRAS 2013: Paragraph 3B(1)). The IRAS is
equally firm with regard to the numbering of apartments on each floor: “Units are generally
numbered sequentially in a clock-wise direction starting from “01”. An apartment number
will be provided for each distinct unit shown on the floor plan. Omission and reservation
of any numbers are not allowed for a residential development” (IRAS 2013: Paragraph
3B(3)). In addition, the IRAS assigns a unique 6-digit postal code to every building.5
prevent the percentage of any particular race from exceeding specified quotas.
5By contrast, the authorities in other countries are more flexible. In the United States, many high-rise
hotels lack a 13th floor (USA Today, 2007). The Hong Kong authorities are particularly accommodating
of real estate developers in floor numbering. The sales brochure for the Arch, a development in West
Kowloon, boldly advertised that “[t]here are no 14, 24, 34, 40-49, 53-54, 58, 60-61, 64 & 74F”. In the
absence of units with unlucky numbers, any research would be limited to investigating only the effects of
lucky numbers.
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3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 The Demand for Lucky Addresses
Previous research on the demand for residential housing among Chinese buyers identifies
preferences over the house number (Fortin et al. 2014) as well as the floor number (Shum
et al. 2014). To encompass both aspects, we define an ordinal variable for the lucky
address number as follows:
4 = very lucky if the last digits of both floor and unit numbers are “8”;
3 = lucky if the last digit of either floor or unit number is “8” and neither last digit is
“4”;
2 = neutral if not very lucky, lucky, unlucky, or very unlucky;
1 = unlucky if the last digit of either floor or unit number is “4” and neither last digit
is “8”;
0 = very unlucky if the last digits of both floor and unit numbers are “4”.
The above ordinal classification represents Chinese dislike of the number “4” and
preference for the number “8” in a fairly flexible way. It explicitly allows complementarity
in lucky/unlucky addresses; for instance, the premium for very lucky addresses needs not
be double the premium for lucky addresses. Moreover, by grouping addresses with only one
lucky (unlucky) number regardless whether it is from unit number or floor, we implicitly
restrict that buyers are indifferent between address like 02-08 or 08-02 after controlling
for all other housing characteristics. This restriction helps us to separately identify the
impact of floor and luckiness of an address on housing price. Without this constraint, the
identification of the price premium of lucky floor depends on the assumed functional form
of the relationship between housing price and floor. This is because lucky floors are on
average four floors higher than unlucky floors.6 The only ambiguity of our classification is
6Our sensitivity analyses indeed show that while the price differentials estimated using our preferred
specification are not sensitive to whether floor is included as a linear or quadratic function, the coefficients
on lucky and unlucky floors are sensitive to how floor is controlled for.
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whether to classify mixed addresses like 04-08 and 08-04 in the same category as addresses
with neither unlucky nor lucky numbers such as 03-07. In the main estimates, we classify
mixed addresses as neutral, and exclude them in a robustness check.
We estimate an ordered logit model of the buyer’s choice by address to investigate
the effect of superstition and conspicuous spending on housing demand. Specifically, we
assume that the latent utility received by buyer i from an apartment with a type j address
in quarter q of year t can be expressed as,
y∗itq = α0 + Siα1 +Xiγ + µt + vq + ηitq. (1)
where Si denotes buyer i
′s demographic, economic, and other characteristics; Xi denotes
legal and physical attributes of an apartment including legal tenure, location, size, and
floor level; µt denotes transaction year effects to control for changes over time in the
macroeconomy that affect all residential real estate transactions in the same way; vq
denotes transaction quarter effects to control for potential seasonality; and ηitq is a random
variable with a logistic distribution; α and γ are the estimated coefficients. The probability
that buyer i will buy an apartment with a type j address is defined as
P (yitq = j) = P (κj−1 ≤ y∗itq ≤ κj) = F (y∗itq − κj)− F (y∗itq − κj−1), (2)
where κ is the cut-off value; j ∈ (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) indicates the luckiness of an address; and F
is the logistic cumulative function defined as
F (z) =
ez
1− ez . (3)
While we are interested in how personal characteristics, such as superstitious belief, affect
the demand for lucky addresses, it is still important to control for housing attributes, Xi.
This is because an individual’s decision to buy an apartment with a particular address
could be correlated with legal and physical attributes of the apartment. If buyers with
different characteristics differ in their preference for these legal and physical attributes,
then in the absence of proper control for these attributes, the estimated effects of the
11
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characteristics might be biased. For instance, if the Chinese have a stronger preference
for high floor apartments than non-Chinese, then Chinese buyers will be more likely to
purchase apartments on the 8th floor than on the 4th floor, even if they are neither
superstitious nor spending conspicuously.
Our identification assumption is that in the absence of superstitious belief and con-
spicuous motive, buyer’s characteristics do not affect the demand for lucky addresses after
controlling for legal and physical attributes. To justify this assumption, we note that
the design of Singapore apartments is fairly uniform, with very homogeneous layout on
each floor. A “04” unit is the same on every floor of the building, and similarly, the
“08” unit is the same on every floor. Furthermore, the government’s strict regulation and
the clockwise numbering rule prevent real estate developers from selectively numbering
more desirable apartments (for instance, closer to or further from the elevator); and dis-
allow home-owners from renumbering their apartments. Initially, uniform interior design
is provided by the developers for all apartments in the same building. While home buyers
may change the interior designs after they buy the apartments, our analyses focus on new
sale by the developers so that the price differentials across different types of addresses
are not confounded by the subsequent modifications made by individual buyers. Thus,
the controls for physical attributes would effectively eliminate most heterogeneity among
apartments in the same building.
After controlling for legal and physical attributes, the estimate of α1 reveals whether a
buyer’s preference is correlated with her characteristics. For instance, if S is an indicator
variable for non-superstitious buyers, then a negative and significant αˆ1 suggests that
superstitious belief indeed affects the demand for lucky addresses. One way to measure
the degree of a buyer’s superstitious belief is by looking at the day of the transaction. As
we discussed in Section 2.1, buyers who bought an apartment during the Ghost Month
are unlikely to be superstitious.
12
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3.2 The Price of Lucky Addresses
We run the following regression to estimate the impact of the luckiness of an addresses on
housing price:
pijtq = β0 + pij +Xjβ1 + µt + vq + ijtq, (4)
where p is the logarithm of real price in 2014 Singapore dollars per m2 paid by buyer i
for a type j address in quarter q of year t; pij , where j ∈ (0, 1, 3, 4), captures the price
differential between type j and the neutral addresses (j = 2); µt is transaction year effects
used to control for changes over time in the macroeconomy such as changes in the interest
rates that affect all residential real estate transactions in the same way; vq is transaction
quarter effects to control for potential seasonality; ijtq is a random variable.
A test for pij = 0, ∀j is equivalent to testing whether superstitious belief or conspic-
uous motive can affect housing prices. Since a lucky address can only be used to show
off its buyer’s status if people are aware that it is lucky, the existence of superstitious
belief in an economy is necessary for the conspicuous motive to manifest itself through
the willingness to pay for lucky addresses. However, it does not mean that all buyers who
spend conspicuously on lucky addresses are superstitious. As long as there exist enough
superstitious buyers, buyers trying to spend conspicuously will have an incentive to pay
price premiums for such apartments. In a housing market that is dominated by supersti-
tious or conspicuous buyers, non-superstitious or non-conspicuous buyers might still need
to pay price premiums for lucky addresses and can enjoy discounts for unlucky addresses.
This is because location plays a dominate role in people’s housing choice. On the one
hand, non-superstitious or non-conspicuous buyers might have to compete with super-
stitious or conspicuous buyers for apartments with lucky addresses. On the other hand,
non-superstitious or non-conspicuous owners of apartments with unlucky addresses might
have to sell to superstitious or conspicuous buyers if there are not enough demand from
non-superstitious or non-conspicuous buyers. Therefore forward looking non-superstitious
or non-conspicuous buyers may also demand discounts for unlucky addresses.
13
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Besides living in an apartment with very lucky address, living in a large apartment
or on a top floor also signals the buyer’s status. Hence, these two features could also be
used to measure the conspicuous aspects of housing consumption. However, since size
and floor have intrinsic functional values that are appreciated by all buyers, their impacts
on housing prices cannot be used directly to test the existence of conspicuous motive.
Under the assumption that superstitious belief is uncorrelated with the preference for
large or top floor apartments, if there is no conspicuous motive, the price differentials
should not depend on the size and floor of an apartment. If there is conspicuous motive,
the price premiums for lucky addresses should be bigger for apartments of larger size or
on top floors. If superstitious buyers do not have a stronger preference for these types of
apartments than the other buyers, finding an incremental price premium for larger or top-
floor apartments with lucky addresses would support the conspicuous motive. Therefore,
we further run the following regression:
pijatq = β0 + pij +Xjβ1 + φa +
∑
j
φajAa × (Sj = j) + µt + vq + ijatq, (5)
where φa captures the impact of attribute Aa (such as large size or top floor) on housing
price, and φaj captures an incremental price premium (discount) for an apartment with a
type j address and attribute Aa. When larger size is used as the attribute, we set Aa to
1 if an apartment is larger than 90% of our sample apartments.
4 The Data
Our study combines four different sources of data. The first is a dataset of legal filings
for private housing transactions with the Registry of Land Titles between January 1995
and December 2012. The records contain information on address, name of the building,
floor and unit number, attributes of the apartment, and details of the transaction. The
apartment attributes are legal tenure (freehold or leasehold), type of development (apart-
ment, condominium, or landed), and size in square meters. The transaction details are
date, names and national registration numbers of buyers and sellers, type of sale (new sale,
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subsale, or resale – as explained below), price, and whether the purchase was financed by
a mortgage loan.
A “new sale” refers to a sale of an apartment by the real estate developer, which may
occur either before or after the government issues the “temporary occupation permit”,
which certifies that an apartment is safe for inhabitation. A “subsale” refers to a sale of
an apartment that occurs before the government issues the temporary occupation permit,
by a party who is not a developer. A “resale” refers to a sale of an apartment after the
issuance of the temporary occupation permit, by a party who is not a developer.
The second source of data is a system that we build to classify any person by name
into one of four ethnicities: Chinese, Malay, Indian, and others. The classification is
based on the value of a linear combination of the characteristics of the data. We used a
proprietary dataset of personal information to train the ethnic classifier system. When
validated against a data set of 1,327 persons with confirmed ethnicity, the system achieved
accuracy of over 99 percent in recognizing Chinese names and 82.7 percent in recognizing
non-Chinese names (over 99 percent of persons classified as Chinese were actually Chinese,
and 82.7 percent of those classified as non-Chinese were actually not Chinese). We used the
classification system to identify the ethnicity (Chinese or non-Chinese) of buyers named
in the residential property transactions.
The third source of data is a simple classifier that we build to infer a Singaporean’s
year of birth from their national registration number. The government issued national
registration numbers in sequence by year of birth to people born in the year 1955 and
after. Consequently, the classifier only works for these people. For people born earlier,
the national registration number was not issued in sequence. So it is impossible to infer
their age from the national registration number. For these cases, we assume that they
were born in 1954.
The fourth source of data is a dataset of the firm registration records between 2008 and
2016. For each firm registration, the record includes registration date, names and national
registration numbers of the parties. We link the firm registration records to residential
property transactions through the buyer’s national registration number.
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Our data offer several advantages when testing the impact of superstition on the asset
pricing and the trading behavior. First, unlike other papers use sale data that do not
contain buyers attributes, we are able to match our property sale data to the personal
details of buyers. Second, in our unique housing market setting, we directly measure the
superstitious beliefs and preferences using the Chinese buyers identities and their house
buying and business registration activities during the Ghost months in our identification
strategies. Third, we collect the housing transaction data over a long period of 18 years,
and calculate the holding period returns for the buyers. Through the long time-series
data, we are able to investigate the consumption and investment motives of the buyers of
houses with lucky addresses.
Note that many residential property purchases involve more than one buyers, such as
husband and wife buying jointly. In classifying buyers by race, we construct indicator
variables that equal 1, if at least one buyer belongs to a selected race category; and 0
otherwise. For instance, an apartment is identified to be bought by Chinese, if at least
one buyer is Chinese.
Like Shum et al. (2014), we focus on high-rise residential projects. The floor plans
for high-rise buildings are quite homogeneous, if not identical. Possible differences from
a common floor plan include first floor apartments that might include a terrace, and top
floor apartments that might include a terrace or staked-up floors (double storey units).
By contrast, single-family homes are heterogeneous, and may differ in unobservable ways
that correlate with the house numbers (Fortin et. al. 2014).
Unlike previous studies, we consider only the primary market, i.e., new sales. Apart
from a few transactions with missing details, the data on new sales are quite complete.
Importantly, all new apartments in a building are sold by the same seller (i.e., the de-
velopers), and so within-development estimates would not be confounded by unobserved
differences. In addition, the quality of new apartments is uniform within a building. By
contrast, studies of the secondary market are subject to possible selection bias and differ-
ences among sellers. Moreover, resale apartments might also differ in ways that we cannot
observe, such as renovation and maintenance, which might be correlated with unit or floor
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number.
A government agency, the Urban Redevelopment Authority, publishes limited data on
all private housing transactions in the online database called REALIS. However, REALIS
does not publish the personal information of buyers and sellers. Figure A.1 compares the
numbers of new sales of private housing in the REALIS database and our proprietary
dataset from the legal filings. Evidently, the legal filing dataset we obtain provides a
good coverage from 2000 onward and up to 2009. Between 2000 and 2009, transactions
volumes from both datasets show a cyclical pattern, peaking in 2002 and then falling
sharply in 2003, which is the year of the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome)
crisis. Transactions recovered gradually to a new peak in 2007, before falling sharply
again in 2008 on the advent of the global financial crisis. Accordingly, we focus our
study on transactions that occurred during 2000-2009. After excluding transactions with
incomplete or obviously wrong information, and those with corporate buyers, we end up
with 54,236 new sale transactions for our main analysis. As a robust check, we also consider
transactions in the secondary market, i.e., subsales and resales in some regressions.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The average real price is S$8,424 per square
meter (2014 = 100) or about US$462 per square foot (converted at the average exchange
rate of one Singapore dollar to 59 U.S. cents in 2014). The size of the average apartment
is 118.7 square meters or 1277.7 square feet, and the average price of an apartment is
US$590,183. With regard to nationality and ethnicity, 78.1 percent of the buyers are Sin-
gaporeans (citizens or permanent residents), and about 93 percent of those Singaporean
buyers are Chinese. The ethnic classifier system is accurate in classifying the ethnicity of
Singaporeans, but less accurate for foreigners. Among the foreign buyers, there are In-
donesian Chinese with Malay-like names, which the ethnic classifier might wrongly classify
as non-Chinese.
Table 2 compares the distribution of luckiness of addresses between apartments bought
by Chinese and non-Chinese buyers in the primary market, as well as between apartments
in the primary and the secondary markets. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot
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reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of lucky addresses bought by Chinese
buyers and non-Chinese buyers are the same, the mean test indeed shows that Chinese
are more likely to buy apartments with lucky addresses. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution of lucky addresses in the primary
market is the same as that in the secondary market. The proportion of unlucky and very
unlucky addresses tend to the higher and those of lucky and very lucky addresses tend to
be lower in the secondary than in the primary market. This suggests that at the given
market price differentials, owners of apartments with lucky addresses are less likely to
sell their units while owners of apartments with unlucky addresses are more likely to sell.
The differences between the primary and the secondary markets are due to the fact that
while both the buyer’s and seller’s preference toward lucky addresses affect the secondary
market, it is mostly the buyer’s preference that affects the primary market as the sellers
are all corporations whose primary goal is to maximize their profits. This provides further
supporting evidence for us to focus on the primary market.
For a first look at the data, Figure 1 plots the estimated coefficients on the last digit
of the unit number in a regression of the logarithm of price per square meter on indicators
of the last digit of a unit number in the primary market. Figure 2 plots the estimated
coefficients on floor levels. In addition to floor and the last digit of unit number, we also
control for apartment size, and building fixed effects. Clearly, prices are the lowest for
units with numbers ending in “4” and the highest for units with numbers ending in “8”.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The dotted and solid lines of Figure 2 indicate floors with the last digits ending in “4”
and “8”, respectively. Unlikely in Figure 1, the price differentials between units located on
floor ending with “4”, “8”, and other numbers are much harder to discern. This is likely
due to the strong, and almost linear relationship between the price and floor at least up
to the 47th floor.7
[Insert Figure 2 here]
7It appears that the relationship between floor and price is weaker in buildings with 45 or more floors.
This is largely because there are only nine such transactions in our dataset.
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5 Estimation Results
5.1 Lucky Addresses and Housing Prices
To quantify the impacts of lucky addresses on housing prices, Table 3 presents the ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions of the housing price (specified as the logarithm of price
per square meter). The luckiness of an address is defined based on the combination of
the last digits of unit number and floor number. They are included as a series of dummy
variables with the neutral address as the reference group. By doing so, we assume that
the price premium for an apartment whose unit number ends with “8” will be the same as
an apartment whose floor number ends with “8”. This assumption helps us to disentangle
the impact of the luckiness of a floor number on housing price from the impact of buyer’s
preference for apartments located on higher floors. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3, report
the estimates that control for size, floor, legal tenure (freehold) and development type
(condominium), progressively including finer controls for location: starting with no control
for location, followed by 2-digit postal district fixed effects, 4-digit postal district fixed
effects, and building fixed effects (6-digit), respectively. Our data comprise transactions
in 64 out of a total of 80 2-digit postal districts in Singapore. These 2-digit postal districts
are further divided into 721 4-digit postal districts. Each 4-digit district consists of between
1 and 37 apartment buildings, with an average of less than 6 buildings. Each building
has a distinct 6-digit postal code. Hence, the 4-digit district fixed effects control more
stringently for differences between neighborhoods than the 2-digit fixed effects.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Regardless of the postal district controls, apartments with very unlucky addresses
(j = 0) are always the cheapest, and those with very lucky addresses (j = 4) are the most
expensive. Controlling for the 2-digit postal districts reduces the estimated discount for
very unlucky addresses by 2.6 percentage points from 3.9% to 1.3%, and the premium
for very lucky addresses by 0.8 percentage points from 3.7% to 2.9%. The results sug-
gest significant variations in the composition of apartments with lucky addresses across
districts.
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In Singapore, the maximum height of each building varies across districts, as stipulated
by the government’s Master Plan.8 Buildings with fewer than eight floors do not have any
very lucky addresses. Hence, the supply of very lucky numbers would be relatively lower
in districts with fewer high-rise buildings. If the average housing price varies across the
districts, failing to control for geographic location could bias the estimated impact of the
luckiness of an address on housing price. Except for the premium for very lucky addresses,
the estimated relationships between the luckiness of an address and price hardly change
when we control for the 4-digit compared to the 2-digit postal districts. The results suggest
that the 4-digit postal district fixed effects effectively control for most of the bias caused
by cross-district variations in the composition of apartments with lucky addresses. Indeed,
the coefficients on lucky addresses hardly change, even when we impose a more stringent
control with the 6-digit postal codes, which is unique to each apartment building. After
controlling for the building fixed effects, the estimated discount for very unlucky addresses
is 1.3%, and the premium for very lucky addresses is 1.9%.
To check whether the results are stable over time and robust to the sample selection,
column (5) reports the estimates using an extended sample period from 1995 to 2013. The
estimates in column (5) are almost identical to those in column (4), suggesting that our
price differentials across different types of addresses are stable over time, at least since
1995. Column (6) extends the sample to include transactions in the secondary market.
While including transactions from the secondary market increases the price discounts
for unlucky addresses and decreases the price premiums for lucky addresses slightly, the
differences are not statistically significant.
When we define the luckiness of an address, we do not differentiate buyers’ preference
for lucky floors from that for lucky unit numbers. For instance, we assume that an
apartment located on the 8th floor with a unit number 07 will be ranked equally as
an apartment located on the 7th floor with a unit number 08. In other words, we assume
that people value the luckiness of a floor number and the luckiness of a unit number
8The Master Plan is a statutory land use plan that guides the physical developments of Singapore in
the medium term; and the land use plan defines the permitted land use type and density for every land
parcel in Singapore. The plan is reviewed every 5 years.
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equally. To check whether our results are sensitive to how we rank an address’s luckiness,
we relax this assumption by including indicators for lucky and unlucky unit numbers and
for lucky and unlucky floor numbers separately and re-run all regressions. An apartment
is considered as having a lucky unit number if it ends with 8 (referred as U8 unit) and as
having an unlucky unit number if it ends with 4 (referred as U4 unit). An apartment is
considered as having a lucky floor number if it ends with 8 (referred as F8 unit) and as
having an unlucky floor number if it ends with 4 (referred as F4 unit). We also include
the interaction between U4 and F4, and between U8 and F8, to capture the potential
non-additive relationship between lucky (unlucky) unit number and lucky (unlucky) floor
number.
Table 4 reports the estimation results. In general, the results are consistent with
Table 3. There are price discounts for unlucky addresses and price premiums for luck
addresses. While the coefficients on U4 and U8 are relatively stable across specifications,
the coefficients on F4 and F8 are less stable. This is due to the fact that building height
varies considerably across postal districts and the coefficients on F4 and F8 are sensitive to
the estimated relationship between floor and housing price. Nevertheless, the coefficient
on U4 is similar to that on F4 and the coefficient on U8 is similar to that on F8 in
columns (2) and (3), which supports our assumption that buyers value the luckiness of
a floor number and that of a unit number equally. Controlling for building fixed effects
decreases the estimated discount for F4 while having little effect on other estimates. Even
with the change in the coefficient on F4, the joint effect of the luckiness of a floor and that
of a unit is still very close to what we found in Table 3. For instance, according to the
estimates reported in column (4), the implied discount for very unlucky units is 1.3% and
the premium for very lucky units is 1.9%. The negative sign on the interaction between
U4 and F4 and the positive sign on U8 and F8 suggests that the impact of the luckiness
of a floor number and the luckiness of a unit number is likely to be complimentary. This
suggests that our conclusions are not sensitive to how we specify the luckiness of an
address.
Having established the relationship between housing price and the luckiness of ad-
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dresses, we investigate whether this relationship is driven by superstitious belief or con-
spicuous consumption or both in the next two subsections.
5.2 Numerological Preferences
Because an apartment with lucky addresses only has a conspicuous spending value if people
believe that it is lucky or share the superstitious belief, the differences between Chinese
and non-Chinese cannot be used to differentiate these two sources. In this subsection, we
propose to use people’s economic activities during the Ghost Month. Presumably, people
who did purchase a house or register a firm during the Ghost Month are likely to be
less-superstitious if some people avoid making major economic decisions during the Ghost
Month. To test this hypothesis, we first examine whether people are less likely to buy
an apartment or register a firm during the Ghost Month. From our transaction data and
the firm registration data, we calculate the number of apartments sold and the number of
firms registered each day. Then we regress these two series on a Ghost Month indicator.
We also control for year fixed-effects, month fixed-effects, and day-of-week fixed effects.
Table 5 reports the results. Column (1) shows that daily firm registration volume
declines by 11.4, which is about 7 percent of the sample mean. Column (2) shows that
daily new sales volume declines by 4, which is about 22 percent of the sample mean. The
empirical evidence indicates that a considerable number of people in Singapore still avoid
engaging in major economic activities during the Ghost Month. Hence, those who did
purchase a flat or register a firm during the Ghost Month are likely to be less-superstitious.
To further check whether less superstitious individuals in one market also tend to
be less superstitious in another market, we estimate the relationship between these two
activities among Singaporeans who bought at least one apartment between 2000 and
2009 and registered at least one firm between 2008 and 2016. Column (3) shows that the
proportion of people who bought an apartment in the Ghost Month is 0.8 percentage points
higher among those who registered a firm in the Ghost Month than those who registered
a firm in other months. Since only 11 percent of our sample bought an apartment in the
Ghost Month, the 0.8 percentage-point difference between these two groups is economically
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meaningful. We add personal characteristics as additional controls and report the results
in column (4). The estimated relationship between these two activities hardly changes,
suggesting that the acts of avoiding economic activities during the Ghost Month are not
purely by chance, but by conscious actions of buyers.
As for personal characteristics, the estimate shows that younger buyers are more likely
to purchase a flat in Ghost Month, i.e. they are less superstitious than older cohorts. While
statistically insignificant, the negative coefficient on non-Chinese might seem strange. This
is because we have already included an indicator for those who registered a firm during
the Ghost Month. If we do not control for that, the coefficient on non-Chinese would have
been positive, although still not significant. Nevertheless, the coefficient on “buyer with an
English name” will become statistically significant, suggesting that the more westernized
individuals are less affected by the traditional Chinese superstitious belief.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Having established the relationship between people’s economic activities in the Ghost
Month and superstitious belief, we further analyze how superstitious belief affects the
demand for luck addresses. Table 6 reports the ordered logit regressions with the cate-
gorical choices ordered from the very unlucky unit (last digits of floor and unit numbers
are both “4”) to the very lucky unit (last digits of floor and unit numbers are both “8”)
as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows the results using all new sales with controls
for legal tenure, physical attributes, year and month of purchase fixed effects, and the
4-digit postal district fixed effects. The coefficient on “Bought in Ghost Month” dummy
is estimated at -0.091 (s.e. 0.053), which implies that the demand for lucky addresses is
significantly lower in the Ghost Month than in other months. Assuming that people who
purchase apartments during the Ghost Month are less superstitious, our results suggest
that superstitious belief indeed affects the demand for lucky addresses.
The coefficient on non-Chinese is negative and statistically significant at -0.144 (s.e.
0.029), suggesting that Chinese buyers have a stronger incentive to buy luck addresses
than non-Chinese. Column (2) further controls for whether the buyer also registered a
firm during the Ghost Month and restricts the sample to include only individuals who
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registered a firm and bought an apartment. The restriction shrinks our sample by about
50%. The coefficient on “Registered a firm in the Ghost Month” dummy is negative but
not statistically significant. Nevertheless, adding the new control has little impact on
the coefficient on “Bought in Ghost Month”. Column (3) further includes the interaction
between “Bought in Ghost Month” and “Registered a firm in the Ghost Month”. The
coefficient on the interaction term is -0.356 (s.e. 0.197). It suggests that individuals
who bought an apartment as well as registered a firm during the Ghost Month has
a much weaker demand for lucky addresses. This evidence supports the hypothesis that
superstitious belief is responsible for the demand for lucky addresses. Column (4) examines
whether the demand for luck addresses differs between investors, defined as those who
bought multiple properties during the sample period, and non-investors. The coefficient
on investor is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.9 This result suggests
that investors are sophisticated buyers and they take future buyers’ preference for lucky
addresses into considerations when they invest in properties. It implies that given a large
proportion of superstitious and conspicuous buyers in the market, even non-superstitious,
non-conspicuous buyers might contribute to the price premiums due to their sophistication.
[Insert Table 6 here]
It should be noted that the demand for lucky addresses does not necessarily imply
that apartments with lucky addresses will command a price premium. For instance, if
apartments with lucky addresses account for 10% of the total market, while only 5% of
the buyers are willing to pay a price premium for these apartments, these buyers will not
need to pay a premium for these lucky addresses in a competitive market. Nevertheless,
these 5% buyers will buy apartments with lucky addresses. This implies that buyers
are sorted according to their willingness to pay for the lucky addresses, and the price
premiums are determined by the marginal buyers’ willingness to pay. The logic is similar
to the economic effects of discrimination in Becker (1957) where wage gap is determined
by marginal employer’s preference. Given that ethnic Chinese makeup 74% of Singapore’s
9We have tried several alternative ways to define investor, such as holding multiple properties or bought
more than 2 properties during our sample period. The estimate is not sensitive to how we define this
variable.
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population according to the 2010 population census and 87% of the buyers in our sample,
the marginal buyers for apartments with lucky addresses are more likely to be Chinese
than non-Chinese. Nevertheless, non-Chinese could still be the marginal buyers in some
buildings.
To test whether marginal buyers drive the price premium, we study the heterogeneous
effect on price across building with different proportion of Chinese buyers. We first check
whether there are enough variations in the proportion of Chinese buyers across buildings by
lucky and unlucky addresses. Figure 3(a) plots the cumulative density function of the share
of Chinese buyers in a building’s lucky addresses, and Figure 3(b) plots the cumulative
density function of the share of Chinese buyers in a building’s unlucky addresses. In these
plots, an address is considered as lucky if its address type j > 2, and unlucky if its address
type j < 2. Figures 3(a) shows that the share of Chinese buyers of lucky address is lower
than 50% in 7.6% of the buildings and lower than 80% in 26% of the buildings. Figure
3(b) shows that the share of Chinese buyers of lucky address is lower than 50% in 7.4% of
the buildings and lower than 80% in 29% of the buildings. The slightly smaller share of
Chinese buyers of unlucky addresses than lucky addresses further confirms that Chinese
buyers prefer apartments with lucky addresses.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 report the results using apartments sorted into the two
groups by the share of Chinese buyers of lucky addresses in a building. About 16% of our
new sale transactions (26% of the buildings) are from buildings where the share of Chinese
buyers of lucky addresses is lower than 80%. Interestingly, even among these buildings,
lucky addresses are still sold at a 0.7% price premium although the coefficient on very
lucky addresses becomes insignificant. The latter is likely to be driven by the fact that
there are only 62 out of 9,543 transactions that have a very lucky address. This suggests
that even in buildings where the share of non-Chinese buyers of lucky addresses exceeds
20%, those non-Chinese buyers still need to pay a price premium for these units. This is
because there are always some Chinese buyers who are willing to buy those lucky units
at the market price premium. It is also interesting to note that buyers for apartments
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with unlucky addresses cannot enjoy any significant amount of discount. This is because
the presence of a considerable number of non-Chinese buyers makes them the marginal
buyers. For buildings where the share of Chinese buyers of lucky addresses is at least 80%,
buyers of lucky units need to pay about a 0.5% price premium and buyers of very lucky
units need to pay a 2.2% price premium. Moreover, buyers of unlucky units can enjoy
a 0.5% price discount and buyers of very unlucky units can enjoy a 1.4% price discount.
All price differentials are statistically significant at the 5% level. Similar conclusions can
be drawn from columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 if we group building based on the share of
Chinese buyers of unlucky addresses.
There are two types of buyers in the market: those with a preference for luck addresses,
and those without. The former clearly know some buyers prefer lucky addresses, hence
they are informed. The latter could be either informed, or uninformed, i.e., they do not
know that some buyers prefer lucky addresses. To check whether the price premiums and
discounts vary across different types of buyers, we include interactions between a series of
buyer characteristics with the luckiness of an address in the price regression and report
the results in columns (1) - (3) in Table 8.
We use the following three characteristics to approximate buyers’ type, non-Chinese,
Chinese who bought houses or registered firms in the Ghost month, and Chinese investors.
Non-Chinese are likely to be uninformed while less superstitious Chinese are likely to be
informed. Column (1) shows the interaction between non-Chinese and the luckiness of an
address. For Chinese buyers, the price discount for unlucky addresses and price premium
for lucky addresses are similar to the results in Table 3. The coefficient of the interaction
between non-Chinese and the very lucky address indicator is negative and significant at
the 1% level. The sum of the coefficient on this interaction term and the coefficient on
“Very lucky” indicator is slightly negative and insignificant. It suggests that non-Chinese
buyers do not pay a price premium for very lucky addresses. In column (2) and (3), we
focus on Chinese buyers since the majority of Chinese buyers are likely to be aware of the
numerological preference even if they do not believe it themselves. Column (2) shows the
interaction between those who bought houses or registered firms in the Ghost Month and
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the luckiness of an address. Column (3) shows the interaction between investors and the
luckiness of an address. The coefficients on those interaction terms tend to be small and
statistically insignificant. These results show that less-superstitious buyers pay a similar
price premium for lucky addresses as other buyers.
Why do non-Chinese not pay price premiums for very lucky addresses but less super-
stitious Chinese buyers still do? One possible explanation is that non-Chinese do not know
about the preference for lucky addresses. They do not consider the price premium they
might receive when they sell the house and so their willingness to pay for lucky addresses
is similar to neutral addresses. In contrast, Chinese buyers are likely to be aware of the
numerological preference even they do not believe it themselves. Some of them might be
willing to pay for lucky addresses since they can sell the house at a price premium in the
future.
5.3 Conspicuous Consumption
To examine the role of conspicuous consumption in the housing market, we need some
observed housing features that are related to conspicuous consumption but not to su-
perstition. As discussed in subsection 3.2, the size and floor of an apartment are two
potential candidates. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 show that the coefficients on the
indicator “Bought in Ghost Month” is insignificant both statistically and economically,
which suggests that demands for these two features do not depend on buyers’ superstitious
belief. Hence, in the absence of conspicuous spending motive, the price premium for units
with lucky addresses should neither depend on their size, nor on whether they are located
on the top floor. If the price premiums for these units are higher than the other units,
then the evidence suggests that there exists conspicuous spending motive in the housing
market.
If the demand for lucky addresses is partially driven by conspicuous motive, then buyers
who bought lucky addresses for the purpose of conspicuous spending might also have a
stronger motivation to buy a larger or top-floor unit. If they are also the marginal buyers,
they will drive up the price premiums for larger or top-floor units with lucky addresses.
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Moreover, given the limited supply of larger or top-floor units with very lucky addresses,
these buyers are very likely to be the marginal buyers.
Column (4) of Table 8 reports the regression results with an interactive term between a
series of indicators for the luckiness of an address and a large unit dummy. The coefficient
on the interaction terms between large apartments and very lucky address is 0.078 (s.e.
0.026), suggesting that buyers need to pay an additional 8% for large apartments with very
lucky addresses on top of the 1.7% premium for regular size apartments with very lucky
addresses. The coefficient on the interaction between large apartments and lucky address
is slightly positive while the coefficient on the interaction between large apartments and
unlucky address is slightly negative. Neither of them is statistically significant, suggesting
no further premium for large apartments with lucky addresses and no further discount for
large apartments with unlucky addresses. Column (5) of Table 8 reports the regression
results with an interaction term between a series of indicators for the luckiness of an
address and a top-floor unit dummy. Consistent with column (4), we find that buyers
need to pay an additional 7.1% for top-floor apartments with very lucky addresses on top
of the 1.7% premium for non-top-floor apartments with very lucky addresses.
Overall, the results in columns (4) and (5) of Table 8 suggest that the conspicuous
spending motive is also responsible for the price premium for apartments with lucky
addresses.
5.4 Consequences and Implications
We have shown that both superstition and conspicuous spending contribute to the price
premium of lucky addresses. We now investigate the consequences of the preference for
lucky addresses on different types of home buyers.
Table 6 shows that not only superstitious buyers or conspicuous buyers have a higher
demand for lucky addresses, property investors, who are less superstitious and have weaker
conspicuous motive since they do not live in these apartments, also have a higher demand
for lucky addresses. This is likely because investors are informed buyers and they consider
future buyers’ preference for lucky addresses when they buy properties. It implies that
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given a large proportion of superstitious and conspicuous buyers in the market, even non-
superstitious, non-conspicuous buyers might contribute to the price premiums due to their
expectations of other buyers’ preferences.
The redistribution effect among different types of home buyers is one possible outcome
of the preference for lucky addresses. Investors are likely to be aware of and attentive
to the superstitious beliefs of Chinese buyers. Non-Chinese, who are aware of the su-
perstitious beliefs of Chinese buyers, however, may not be attentive to the extent of the
premiums (discounts) for lucky (unlucky) units. Non-Chinese buyers are more likely to
sell their apartments to Chinese buyers, who constitute the largest proportion of buyers
in the secondary market. As a result, the existence of premiums (discounts) for lucky
(unlucky) addresses might create redistributive effects among different types of buyers.
We investigate the distributive effects in the paper by analyzing the returns in the resale
market.
To check whether the economic returns from housing investment depend on the lucki-
ness of its address, we first regress the annualized returns on a series of indicator variables
of the luckiness of an address, size, floor, time of initial purchase, time of resale, and
building fixed-effects. Column (1) of Table 9 reports the estimation results. Except for
the coefficient on “Unlucky” address, all the other coefficients are negative but not statis-
tically significant even at the 10% level. The evidence suggests that the economic returns
from buying either an apartment with lucky or unlucky, particularly lucky addresses are
at best the same as that of buying an apartment with a neutral address.
Column (2) adds the interaction terms between the non-Chinese indicator and the
indicator variables of the luckiness of an address. Interestingly, the coefficient on the
interaction between non-Chinese and “very lucky” is positive and significant while the
coefficient on the interaction between non-Chinese and unlucky is negative and insignifi-
cant. Why do non-Chinese enjoy a higher return from buying apartments with very lucky
addresses, even though they may be naive and may not know about other people’s pref-
erence for lucky addresses? Figure 3 and Table 8 show that non-Chinese buyers could
be the marginal buyers in some buildings even though most buyers are Chinese. When
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non-Chinese are the marginal buyers, they do not pay a price premium. When they sell
their apartments, however, it is likely that they will be able to sell to Chinese buyers who
are willing to pay a price premium for these “very lucky” apartments.
Columns (3) and (4) focus on Chinese buyers since most of them should be aware of the
Chinese numerological preference even though they may or may not believe it themselves.
Column (3) includes an indicator variable that equals one if the buyer bought an apartment
or registered a firm in the Ghost Month, as well as its interactions with the four indicators
of luckiness of address. The results show that those who bought lucky addresses have
slightly lower return than those who bought neutral addresses. Nevertheless, none of the
coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant even at the 10% level.
Under the assumption that individuals who bought an apartment in the Ghost Month are
less superstitious, the similarity in the returns between these two types of buyers suggests
that they behave similarly in the housing market. Therefore, superstitious belief is not the
only driver for the price differentials across different address types. Column (4) includes
an indicator of whether a buyer is an investor and its interactions with the four indicators
of luckiness. Similarly, none of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically
significant even at the 10% level. The similarity in the returns between investors and other
buyers suggests that these two types of buyers behave similarly in the housing market.
Overall, the results in Table 9 suggest that the preference for lucky addresses does
have consequences in the housing market in addition to the price differentials across dif-
ferent address types. The uninformed buyers benefit more than the informed buyers.
This is most likely because the uninformed buyers receive a price premium when they sell
their apartments with lucky addresses to Chinese buyers even though they did not pay a
price premium when they bought their apartments in the primary market. In contrast,
informed investors do not earn higher returns due to the following reason. In the mar-
ket segments where the marginal buyers are superstitious or spending conspicuously, the
equilibrium price already reflects the preference. Investors who buy lucky addresses and
hope to sell them at a premium have to pay a price premium in the first place as the
preferences for lucky addresses have already been priced in. Hence, this strategy cannot
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yield any additional returns. The differences in the returns to informed and uninformed
buyers imply a potentially profitable trading strategy in the housing market where agents
have heterogeneous preferences. Investors should look for the market segments where the
marginal buyers are neither superstitious nor spending conspicuously. In these market
segments, since the preferences for lucky addresses have not been priced in, investors can
buy properties with lucky addresses without having to pay a premium, and later sell them
when the marginal buyers are superstitious or spending conspicuously.
5.5 Supply Side Response
Based on the same reasoning as the economic effects of discrimination argued by Becker
(1957), if developers respond to the premiums (discounts) for lucky (unlucky) addresses by
providing more lucky units and less unlucky units in the housing markets, we may expect
the supply-side responses to reduce the premiums (discounts) for the lucky (unlucky)
units. In this sub-section, we conduct several robustness tests on the supply-side responses.
First, we examine the distributions of the physical housing units with lucky addresses and
unlucky addresses. Table 1 shows that there are more unlucky units than lucky units.
We find that unlucky unit accounts for 20% of the total addresses; whereas the lucky
unit account for only 14% of the total addresses. Similarly, units ending with number 4
accounts for 11%; whereas units ending with number 8 accounts for 8%. Second, we test
if there are more lucky addresses in the Chinese concentrated neighborhoods. We regress
the percentage of lucky units per building on the fraction of Chinese in the building,
and find that the coefficient is 0.0063 and is not statistically significant (p=0.83). We
also regress the percentage of very lucky units per building on the fraction of Chinese
in the building; and again find that the coefficient is 0.0016 and it is not statistically
significant (p=0.62). Hence, there is no evidence of the supply-side response in the Chinese
concentrated neighborhoods. Moreover, given the strict planning regulations in Singapore
that disallow manipulations in the numbering of units in high-rise buildings by developers,
our empirical results show no evidence of supply-side adjustments in response to the
preference for lucky addresses.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Using a large and rich micro-level dataset merged from various sources including housing
transactions and company registrations, we find that both superstition and conspicuous
spending affect the purchase of high-rise private apartments in Singapore. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper that directly tests the roles of both superstition and
conspicuous consumption in the housing market. We identify buyers as less superstitious
if they purchased an apartment or registered a firm during the Ghost Month, the seventh
month in the lunar calendar. The rationale is that superstitious individuals would have
avoided making major decisions during this month if they believe in the Chinese astrology.
By showing that less superstitious buyers have a weaker demand for apartments with
lucky addresses, the evidence suggests that superstition is at least partly responsible for
the observed price differentials across addresses of different degrees of luckiness.
We use two highly visible housing features to measure an apartment’s value for con-
spicuous spending: size and location on the top floor. We show that superstitious beliefs
are uncorrelated with the demand for these two features. Consequently, if people are
willing to pay higher price premiums for lucky apartments of larger size or on the top
floor than lucky apartments of smaller size or below the top floor, then these additional
price premiums must be attributable to the conspicuous motive. We find that buyers are
willing to pay an additional 8% premium for lucky apartments of larger size and 7% for
lucky apartments located on the top floor.
Since housing investment is the single largest financial commitment for most people,
it is important to understand the consequences of paying considerable price premiums
for lucky addresses and enjoying considerable discounts for unlucky addresses. A natural
question is whether the price differentials across different address types in the primary
market lead to differences in investment returns when people sell their apartments. On
average, we do not find any systematic relationship between the luckiness of an address
and its annualized rate of return. Nevertheless, we do find that the return is higher for
non-Chinese buyers who bought apartments with very lucky addresses. Since non-Chinese
buyers do not adhere to the Chinese numerological preferences and they also might not
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know about the Chinese willingness to pay for lucky addresses, they are unlikely to pay
a price premium for these apartments if they do not face competition from superstitious
or conspicuous buyers at the time of purchase. Nevertheless, on the resale markets, they
have a high chance of selling their lucky apartments to Chinese buyers as they are the
majority. As a result, these uninformed buyers in the primary market could potentially
enjoy a higher rate of return. In contrast, for Chinese buyers, since they know that some
people are willing to pay a price premium for lucky apartments, they are also willing to
pay a premium for these apartments even if they themselves are neither superstitious nor
spending conspicuously. Their willingness to pay a price premium for lucky addresses, due
not to their own superstitious belief, but to their belief about other people’ superstitious
belief, would help sustain the price differentials in equilibrium.
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics
VARIABLES Mean SD Min Max
Number of transactions 54,233
Apartment size 118.65 44.94 5 768
S$ per square meter 8424.36 4400.61 2573 54896
Very unlucky unit 0.01 0.11 0 1
Unlucky unit 0.19 0.39 0 1
Lucky unit 0.13 0.34 0 1
Very lucky unit 0.01 0.08 0 1
Unit number ending with 4 0.11 0.31 0 1
Unit number ending with 8 0.08 0.27 0 1
Floor number ending with 4 0.12 0.33 0 1
Floor number ending with 8 0.08 0.27 0 1
99-year leasehold 0.49 0.50 0 1
999-year leasehold 0.04 0.20 0 1
Condominium 0.73 0.44 0 1
Floor number 9.59 8.12 1 68
Ground floor 0.06 0.23 0 1
Top floor 0.08 0.27 0 1
At least 1 Singaporean buyers 0.78 0.41 0 1
At least 1 Chinese buyers 0.93 0.26 0 1
At least 1 buyer w. English name 0.31 0.46 0 1
Registered a firm 0.49 0.50 0 1
Registered a firm in Ghost Month 0.02 0.15 0 1
Bought an apartment in the Ghost Month 0.10 0.30 0 1
Notes: The sample comprises new sales of apartments between the years 2000-09. Transaction prices
are denominated in Singapore dollars per square meter (at the average exchange rate of one
Singapore dollar to 59 U.S. cents in 2014, a price of S$1000 per square meter is equivalent to
US$462 per square foot). Very lucky = last digit of both floor and apartment numbers is “8”;
lucky = last digit of either floor or apartment number is “8” and neither last digit is “4”; unlucky
= last digit of either floor or apartment number is “4” and neither last digit is “8”; very unlucky
= last digit of both floor and apartment numbers is “4”; neutral = all other addresses.
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Table 2: Lucky addresses: Type of sale and buyer ethnicity
New sales Subsales
& resales
All buyers Chinese Non-Chinese All buyers
Very unlucky unit 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Unlucky unit 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21
(0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
Neutral unit 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Lucky unit 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32)
Very lucky unit 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Unit # ending w. 4 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33)
Unit # ending w. 8 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25)
Floor # ending w. 4 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
Floor # ending w. 8 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)
Number of observations 54233 47126 7107 54225
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of distributions between
Chinese and non-Chinese primary and secondary market
P value=0.63 P value=0.00
Test of the equality of the share of apartments with lucky address between
Chinese and non-Chinese primary and secondary market
P value=0.03 P value=0.00
Test of the equality of the share of apartments with unlucky address
Chinese and non-Chinese primary and secondary market
P value=0.14 P value=0.00
Notes: The samples comprise apartments sold between 2000and 2009. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. A apartment is considered as bought by Chinese buyers as long as one of the
buyers is a Chinese.
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Table 3: Lucky address: Prices
New sales Subsales
VARIABLES 2000-2009 All years & resales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Very unlucky unit -0.039*** -0.013** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.018***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Unlucky unit -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Lucky unit 0.013** 0.008** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Very lucky unit 0.037** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017**
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Chinese buyer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lease tenure Yes Yes Yes - - -
Condominium Yes Yes Yes - - -
Building fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Postal district f.e. No 2-digit 4-digit - - -
Building age - - - - - Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54,233 54,233 54,233 54,233 69,069 50,597
R-squared 0.555 0.843 0.928 0.969 0.973 0.926
Mean of log of real price 8.94 8.94 8.94 8.94 9.01 8.85
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of real price in Singapore dollars per m2; Unit characteristics
include a linear trend in floor number, indicators for first and top floors, logarithm of size;
Estimates are robust to controlling for floor number with a quadratic or cubic trend; Robust
standard errors clustered at building level (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). Columns (1)-
(4): New sales to all buyers between 2000 and 2009; Column (5): New sales, including earlier
transactions back to 1995 and forward to 2012; Column (6): Secondary market (subsales and
resales).
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Table 4: Lucky address: Prices (robust)
New sales Subsales
VARIABLES 2000-2009 All years & resales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unit # ending w. 4 -0.011 -0.008* -0.007** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.003
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Floor # ending w. 4 -0.024*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.000 0.000 -0.008***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Unit # ending w. 8 0.009 0.011* 0.007 0.009** 0.009*** 0.007**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Floor # ending w. 8 0.017*** 0.006** 0.005** 0.003* 0.003** 0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Both unit and floor -0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006
# ending w. 4 (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Both unit and floor 0.011 0.011 0.010* 0.007 0.006 0.007
# ending w. 8 (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lease tenure Yes Yes Yes - - -
Condominium Yes Yes Yes - - -
Building fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Postal district fixed effects No 2-digit 4-digit - - -
Building age - - - - - -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54,233 54,233 54,233 54,233 69,069 50,597
R-squared 0.553 0.843 0.924 0.969 0.973 0.925
Mean of y variable 8.94 8.94 8.94 8.94 9.01 8.85
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of price in Singapore dollars per m2; Unit characteristics
include a linear trend in floor number, indicators for first and top floors, logarithm of size;
Estimates are robust to controlling for floor number with a quadratic trend; Robust standard
errors clustered at building level (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). Column (1): New sales to all
buyers with controls; Column (2): New sales to all buyers with controls and 2-digit postal district
fixed effects; Column (3): New sales to all buyers with controls and 4-digit postal district fixed
effects; Column (4): New sales to all buyers with controls and building fixed effects; Column
(5): New sales, including earlier transactions back to 1995 and forward to 2012; Column (6):
Secondary market (subsales and resales)
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Table 5: The impact of superstitious beliefs on economic activities
Daily volume Purchased a flat
VARIABLES Registration Housing in the Ghost Month
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ghost Month -11.026** -4.204***
(5.495) (1.555)
Registered a firm in the Ghost Month 0.008** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
Non-Chinese buyer -0.008
(0.005)
Birth year 0.000**
(0.000)
Buyer with an English name 0.002
(0.003)
Male 0.010***
(0.003)
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes - -
Month fixed-effect Yes Yes - -
Day-of-week fixed effect Yes Yes - -
Observations 3,057 3,041 49,290 46,395
Mean of y variable 157 18 .111 .111
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) is the daily firm registration volume between 2008 to
2016; in columns (2) is the daily new sale volume between 2000 to 2009; in column (3) and (4) is
a indicator variable that equals 1 if a buyer purchased her apartment during the Ghost Month.
The buyers in columns (3) and (4) consists of Singaporeans who bought at least one apartment
in 2000-2009 and registered at least one firm in 2008-2016. Huber-White robust standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01)
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Table 6: Lucky address: Buyer’s choice
Demand for Demand for
Demand for lucky address large units top floor
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bought in Ghost Month -0.091* -0.126* -0.110 -0.090* 0.009 0.008
(0.053) (0.070) (0.071) (0.053) (0.006) (0.006)
Reg. a firm in Ghost Month -0.018 0.017
(0.063) (0.066)
Bought a flat & registered -0.356*
a firm in Ghost Month (0.197)
Non-Chinese buyer -0.144*** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.133*** 0.001 -0.001
(0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.003) (0.004)
Investor 0.075***
(0.023)
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
month fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Postal district fixed-effect 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit
Observations 54,233 26,522 26,522 54,233 54,233 54,233
Mean of y variable 1.93 1.94 1.94 1.93 0.08 0.08
Notes: Columns (1) - (4) report results from ordered logit models of demand for very lucky, lucky,
neutral, unlucky, and very unlucky addresses, estimated by maximum likelihood; Ordered logit
cut-points not reported; Columns (5) and (6) report results from a linear probability model of
demand for large units (top 10 in terms of size) and top-floor units, respectively; Unit character-
istics include a linear trend in floor number, indicators for first and top floors, logarithm of size,
lease tenure, and an condominium indicator; Robust standard errors clustered at building level.
Investors are defined as buyers who purchased multiple properties during the sample period. (*
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). The sample in columns (1), (4), (5), and (6) consists of all
new sale transactions between 2000 and 2009. The sample in columns (2) and (3) consist of
individuals who bought a new apartment and registered a firm.
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Table 7: Sub-sample analyses
Share of Chinese buyer
of lucky address of unlucky address
<80% ≥80% <80% ≥80%
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Very unlucky -0.004 -0.014*** -0.006 -0.015***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003)
Unlucky -0.002 -0.005** -0.001 -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Lucky 0.007** 0.005** 0.009* 0.005***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Very Lucky 0.002 0.022*** 0.021 0.017***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007)
Constant 9.713*** 9.635*** 9.550*** 9.682***
(0.087) (0.074) (0.127) (0.063)
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Building fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,543 44,690 13,331 40,902
R-squared 0.975 0.965 0.972 0.966
Mean of log price 9.16 8.89 9.11 8.88
Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of price in Singapore dollars per m2; Unit characteristics
include a linear trend in floor number, indicators for first and top floors, logarithm of size;
Robust standard errors clustered at building level (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). Column
(1): New sales in buildings where the share of Chinese buyers of lucky units is lower than 80%;
Column (2): New sales in buildings where the share of Chinese buyers of lucky units is at least
80%; Column (3): New sales in buildings where the share of Chinese buyers of unlucky units
is lower than 80%; Column (4): New sales in buildings where the share of Chinese buyers of
unlucky units is at least 80%.
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Table 8: Lucky address: Prices (heterogeneity)
Z=
Non- Less Investor Larger Top
Chinese Superstitious
buyers buyers units floors
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very unlucky × Z -0.009 -0.012 -0.006 -0.061* 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.031) (0.024)
Unlucky × Z 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008)
Lucky × Z -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
Very Lucky × Z -0.037** 0.030 -0.003 0.078*** 0.071**
(0.017) (0.025) (0.016) (0.026) (0.033)
Very unlucky -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Unlucky -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Lucky 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Very Lucky 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Building fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54,233 47,126 47,126 47,126 47,126
R-squared 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.969 0.968
Mean of y variable 8.94 8.92 8.92 8.92 8.92
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of price in Singapore dollar per m2. ; Unit characteris-
tics include a linear trend in floor number, indicators for first and top floors, logarithm of size;
Estimates are robust to controlling for floor number with a quadratic or cubic trend; Robust
standard errors clustered at building level (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). Lucky addresses
are interacted with Non-Chinese buyer, less superstitious buyers defined as those who bought
an apartment or registered a firm in the Ghost Month, Investor, large apartment, and top floor
in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) respectively. In columns (1) the sample consists of all new sales
between 2000 and 2009. In columns (2) to (5), the sample is restrict to Chinese buyers.
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Table 9: Changes in price of resold units
Non-Chinese Less Investor
superstitious
buyers
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Very unlucky × Z -0.008 -0.114 -0.010
(0.024) (0.084) (0.028)
Unlucky × Z 0.055 -0.004 -0.010
(0.050) (0.013) (0.008)
Lucky × Z 0.005 -0.013 -0.006
(0.014) (0.013) (0.008)
Very Lucky × Z 0.055** 0.067 0.041
(0.025) (0.042) (0.036)
Very unlucky -0.010 -0.018 -0.007 -0.017**
(0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Unlucky 0.011 -0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Lucky -0.001 -0.009** -0.006 -0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Very Lucky 0.010 -0.015 -0.023 -0.034
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Building fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchasing year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchasing month fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resale year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Resale month fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,845 12,845 11,196 11,196
R-squared 0.321 0.306 0.376 0.376
Mean of y variable .09 .09 .08 .08
Notes: The depend variable is the annualized returns. In columns (1) and (2), the sample consists of
all new sale units (2000 and 2009) that are resold between 200 and 2009. In columns (3) and
(4), we exclude new sale units initially bought by non-Chinese. Lucky addresses are interacted
with Non-Chinese buyer, less superstitious buyers defined as those who bought an apartment
or registered a firm in the Ghost Month and investor in columns (2), (3), and (4) respectively.
Robust standard errors clustered at building level (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01).
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Figure 1: Price and unit number
Figure 2: Price and floor number
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(a) Lucky addresses
(b) Unlucky addresses
Figure 3: The distribution of share of Chinese buyers of lucky and unlucky addresses in a
building
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A Appendix
Figure A.1: Transactions by year
Note: Number of new sales, by year from 1995 to 2012. Solid red line depicts the number of new
sales as recorded in the Urban Redevelopment Authoritys REALIS database. Broken blue line
depicts the number of new sales as recorded in our data-set of legal filings with the Registry of
Land Titles.
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